#bankruptcy

How much longer will this outfit last till its bankrupt or bought out? 5 years, 10, ???

WWD.com EXCLUSIVE: Navigating the Saks Global Bankruptcy — the Roadmap Ahead

CEO Geoffroy van Raemdonck details progress in the Chapter 11 proceedings, what to expect in the coming weeks, and plans for getting Saks Global back on its feet.
By
DAVID MOIN
Plus Icon
MARCH 13, 2026, 12:01AM

Saks Global is expected to emerge from bankruptcy proceedings before the end of the year with new ownership, a five-year business plan, and a strategy designed to better differentiate the merchandising and marketing of Saks Fifth Avenue and Neiman Marcus.
“It’s moving faster than I anticipated,” Geoffroy van Raemdonck, chief executive officer of Saks Global, told WWD, exclusively discussing the Saks Global Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings and what to expect in the coming weeks. “We were able to make very decisive decisions in less than 60 days, to focus on luxury.”

Since Saks Global filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on Jan. 13, “Step one was to get the financing. Step two was to get the inventory, and now we are really focused on the vision for the future — and how the company is going to be structured when it emerges from bankruptcy,” van Raemdonck said. “The restructuring plan is going to be filed in weeks from now, and that will detail how this company will be structured, from a business plan, from a capital structure, post emerging.”

The plan is being formulated by Saks Global in negotiations with creditors, who will vote on the plan, which then must get final approval by the bankruptcy court for the company to emerge from bankruptcy.
“What the business plan will show is that we have a plan of action to drive sales, to grow from a smaller footprint, and to be significantly more profitable,” van Raemdonck said. “It is also going to demonstrate that we have ample liquidity to operate and fund the business, as well as generate free cash flow to invest in the business over the next five years. That’s what this business plan will be detailing.”

“What’s changed over the last two months is that we have $1.75 billion of committed capital. We have $825 million that we’ve received, and we are receiving another $300 million in a matter of days or weeks. It’s really, really close…When we entered the [bankruptcy] process, we received DIP (debtor-in-possession) financing and we put in a topline revenue budget and a budget for receiving inventory, and we are exceeding both the revenue budget and the amount of inventory we are receiving, which is very encouraging.

“Yes, we had a problem of liquidity,” van Raemdonck admitted. “It led to a problem of inventory and performance. That was the summary of last year. The summary of this year is we are through a financial restructuring that gives us access to liquidity and allows us to refocus the business on the most valuable assets we have, and when we emerge later this year, we will be able to perform at the level we want.”
Inventory Flowing In
While there’s no guarantee that Saks Global successfully emerges from bankruptcy this year, van Raemdonck, while being interviewed from the Brookfield Place headquarters of Saks Global in lower Manhattan, cited progress in the court proceedings, and expressed gratitude that many designers and brands have either continued or resumed shipping the luxury retailer. He said brands have committed to close to $1.3 billion of inventory.
“That’s 80 percent of the [spring] season that we need to have. And that number is growing week by week,” he said. “I was looking at our receipts this month — they’re up 63 percent compared to last year, and from February to this month to date, we are up 15 percent… We have many, many brands, but if you take our top 100 or 200 brands, none have said they’re not going to do business with us going forward. Brands are really catching up very fast and supporting us. I don’t take that for granted. We need — and we are — actively rebuilding their trust.”

“Yes, we had a problem of liquidity,” van Raemdonck admitted. “It led to a problem of inventory and performance. That was the summary of last year. The summary of this year is we are through a financial restructuring that gives us access to liquidity and allows us to refocus the business on the most valuable assets we have, and when we emerge later this year, we will be able to perform at the level we want.”
Inventory Flowing In
While there’s no guarantee that Saks Global successfully emerges from bankruptcy this year, van Raemdonck, while being interviewed from the Brookfield Place headquarters of Saks Global in lower Manhattan, cited progress in the court proceedings, and expressed gratitude that many designers and brands have either continued or resumed shipping the luxury retailer. He said brands have committed to close to $1.3 billion of inventory.
“That’s 80 percent of the [spring] season that we need to have. And that number is growing week by week,” he said. “I was looking at our receipts this month — they’re up 63 percent compared to last year, and from February to this month to date, we are up 15 percent… We have many, many brands, but if you take our top 100 or 200 brands, none have said they’re not going to do business with us going forward. Brands are really catching up very fast and supporting us. I don’t take that for granted. We need — and we are — actively rebuilding their trust.”

Saks Global has indicated that post-petition invoices for merchandise receipts will be paid pursuant to current terms, which are set at 90 days from receipt of goods, though payment terms can vary by brand. It’s expected that if and when Saks Global emerges from bankruptcy, payment terms would revert to those that were in place prior to Saks Global’s acquisition of Neiman Marcus Group, though a schedule for paying vendors must be approved by the bankruptcy court judge. Thirty- to 60-day payment terms are the industry standard.
Under Saks Global’s prior regime, the company largely lost the support of the fashion industry due to its failure to pay bills for several seasons and a host of unmet promises. Consequently, the stores were depleted of merchandise, market share was lost, and competitors, most notably Bloomingdale’s and Nordstrom, have been taking advantage of the situation by aggressively working to add designers they did not previously sell, and provide more space in their stores to certain designers that they already did sell.

But at Saks Global, much has happened in the two months since going bankrupt to obtain financing to replenish inventories and maintain operations and set a new foundation for a potentially more viable — and streamlined — future.
It’s expected that through a debt-for-equity swap, key bondholders, including Pentwater Capital and Bracebridge Capital leading the lending group arranging a $1.75 billion financing package for Saks Global in bankruptcy, will become owners in Saks Global. In effect, Saks Global will become a new debt-free or near debt-free company post bankruptcy. Hudson Bay Co., Amazon, Authentic Brands Group, and G-III all had equity stakes in Saks Global going into the bankruptcy, but it’s anticipated they will see the value of those shares slip away in the court-led process.

Chapter 11 bankruptcy enables a retailer to get out of leases without penalty. Saks Global is closing 20 Saks Fifth Avenuestores, leaving just 13 operating, including the Fifth Avenue flagship in Manhattan, and shutting four Neiman Marcus units, leaving 32 operating. In addition, Saks Fifth Avenue was pulled off Amazon.com; one distribution center was closed, leaving three operating, though three others were closed pre-bankruptcy, leaving the company with its newest facilities that provide better service, and 57 Saks Off 5th stores are being shuttered, leaving just 12 for the time being. Saks Global has also shut down the Horchow catalogue and the five Last Call clearance centers for Neiman Marcus.

Saks Global volume was listed at about $7.3 billion shortly after the Neiman’s acquisition in fiscal 2024, before the streamlining.
Saks Global executives leave open the possibility that a few more Saks or Neiman’s stores could close.
There has been speculation of asset sales, including Bergdorf Goodman. Asked about that, van Raemdonck replied: “We are always going to continue to look at the footprint, the assets, we have. That’s normal course of business. But today, there are no active conversations about any asset sales.”

Upon going bankrupt, a new management team was set with a blend of senior executives from Saks Fifth Avenue and Neiman Marcus. Van Raemdonck became CEO of Saks Global in January, after sitting on the sidelines of luxury retailing for a year. He had been CEO of the Neiman Marcus Group for nearly seven years until it was purchased by Saks Global.

“I came back because I have a belief in what Saks Global can be, and I’m confident that we can emerge as a strong business,” van Raemdonck told WWD. “What you’re seeing is someone who is very matter-of-fact and very confident. I didn’t have to do this. But I did this out of belief that Saks Global will be successful, and I’m willing to put my reputation on the line.”
Van Raemdonck said he believes combining Saks Fifth Avenue and the Neiman Marcus Group into Saks Global is a good idea. “The merger made a lot of sense to me, because by bringing the two best players in the industry that have three banners [Saks, Neiman’s and Bergdorf’s] you get to attain a certain level of scale and synergies that help your overall profitability and ability to invest.”

Cost Savings
Navigating through the bankruptcy is further challenged by the ongoing systems integrations and consolidations initiated when Saks Global bought NMG for $2.7 billion in December 2024. The goal has been to achieve hundreds of millions of dollars in cost savings by centralizing and eliminating duplicative functions, such as accounting, planning, human resources, legal and distribution facilities. There is now one buying team for Neiman’s and Saks, and one marketing team serving Bergdorf’s, Neiman’s, and Saks. Bergdorf’s has its own buying team. Savings will also be attained through store closings, leading to layoffs and payroll reductions.

Aside from cost savings, the combined business should benefit from access to greater data, sharing best practices, enhanced personalization, and increased use of AI. Merging loyalty programs is a possibility. For example, using each retailer’s credit cards to shop could earn points valid at both Saks and Neiman’s. Or spending enough at either store could lead to access to invitation-only events at both Saks and Neiman’s.
Van Raemdonck described Saks Fifth Avenue and Neiman Marcus as the same yet different — both operating as multibrand luxury retailers but doing it in different ways.
“Neiman Marcus has been a relationship business and very focused on omnichannel, and on wholesale, and the metric of success was profitability,” he said. “Saks was a business that was focused on growth, on digital, and adopted the marketplace format much more, and it didn’t have the same level of profitability,” van Raemdonck said.

“They were both were operating with distinct strategies that resonated with the customer, but with a different impact on profitability and generation of cash flow.”
Sources have told WWD that among true luxury brands — such as Chanel, Dior, and Giorgio Armani — there’s been about 90 percent overlap between Saks and Neiman’s. But Saks has been emphasizing a wider range of categories and price points, attracting a broader demographic, and has been aggressive trying to build business online. Saks stores house many more leased designer shops than Neiman’s, which has long been reluctant to open leased shops but in recent seasons has opened some.
By virtue of its Fifth Avenue flagship being a major tourist attraction, Saks has more international recognition than Neiman’s. In fiscal 2025, the flagship saw nearly 3 million shoppers from over 150 countries, and generated three times the amount of business as the largest Neiman Marcus stores, according to Saks Global.
As van Raemdonck pointed out, Neiman’s has maintained its focus on its wealthiest customers, through exclusive offerings, personal service and VIP-type events. Neiman’s has a track record of providing deeper, broader assortments of each of the top luxury collections it sells, and has a stronger selling culture than Saks.
Differentiating the Banners
Regarding the future of Saks and Neiman’s, van Raemdonck said, “We want to separate and differentiate them. As a point of reference, if you take the six markets where Saks and Neiman’s are either in the same mall, or across the street like in Beverly Hills, the overlapping customer is between 10 and 15 percent which [means] the customer is telling us they’re different brands. And in the future, we want to make them even more different, so that there’s a reason to shop in both of them, or to be deeply loyal with one of them.”

Asked how that’s accomplished, van Raemdonck said, “It’s in the positioning. It’s in the expression, in the assortment, and it can be the same brands [sold at both stores], but the assortment should be slightly different,” meaning each having a different merchandise edit.
“The Saks customer likes to express herself through fashion, but she needs a little bit more guidance in choosing the fashion that is right for her,” van Raemdonck said. “The Neiman’s customer is a fashion customer who has her own sense of taste, loves color, and loves newness, and so their way of approaching the same element of fashion and newness is slightly different.”
Discussing Saks Global overall, van Raemdonck boasted, “We have the largest base of highly engaged luxury customers. Fifty to 60 percent of our sales are with customers who shop seven to nine times a year with us, depending on the retail banner. They spend more than $5,000 with us, and we retain more than 80 percent of them. Forty percent of our sales come from customers who spend $10,000 or more with us. And so the majority of our sales are from loyal customers and when you shop seven to nine times a year, you’re deeply loyal. We have a retention rate of 90 percent from top customers.”
One of the big challenges in a bankruptcy is retaining employees and communicating to all constituencies concerned that the company isn’t disappearing and has a future, even in a downsized state.
“We are doing this very, very frequently and very openly, because transparency is critical,” van Raemdonck said. “This morning I was talking with our employees in Bangalore. We have a whole team there that supports us across all functions,” including creative, planning, merchandising and payroll functions. “This Monday, we had what we call an ‘All Access,’ meeting which is our all-employee town hall. We call it All Access because everyone gets a front row seat [it’s a virtual meeting] and everyone gets access to the information.” It’s a monthly event. “And then we meet with our leadership council, the top 50 people in the organization, every other week. And every week, we talk with the ad hoc group of creditors, and we are meeting in person with the unsecured creditor committee [Thursday] to share with them our business plans. So the communication is very, very frequent. We communicate with brands on a very frequent basis, at my level, and then Lana [Todorovich, chief global brands partnerships officer] is with the brands on a daily basis.

“We have more than 1,500 sales associates who sell at least $1 million per year and in aggregate deliver more than $2.8 billion of revenue,” the CEO added. “Over the last 12 months, our attrition rate amongst top sellers that sell more than $3 million annually is in the low-single digits.”

WWD.com EXCLUSIVE: Navigating the Saks Global Bankruptcy — the Roadmap Ahead

CEO Geoffroy van Raemdonck details progress in the Chapter 11 proceedings, what to expect in the coming weeks, and plans for getting Saks Global back on its feet.
By
DAVID MOIN
Plus Icon
MARCH 13, 2026, 12:01AM

Saks Global is expected to emerge from bankruptcy proceedings before the end of the year with new ownership, a five-year business plan, and a strategy designed to better differentiate the merchandising and marketing of Saks Fifth Avenue and Neiman Marcus.
“It’s moving faster than I anticipated,” Geoffroy van Raemdonck, chief executive officer of Saks Global, told WWD, exclusively discussing the Saks Global Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings and what to expect in the coming weeks. “We were able to make very decisive decisions in less than 60 days, to focus on luxury.”

Since Saks Global filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on Jan. 13, “Step one was to get the financing. Step two was to get the inventory, and now we are really focused on the vision for the future — and how the company is going to be structured when it emerges from bankruptcy,” van Raemdonck said. “The restructuring plan is going to be filed in weeks from now, and that will detail how this company will be structured, from a business plan, from a capital structure, post emerging.”

The plan is being formulated by Saks Global in negotiations with creditors, who will vote on the plan, which then must get final approval by the bankruptcy court for the company to emerge from bankruptcy.
“What the business plan will show is that we have a plan of action to drive sales, to grow from a smaller footprint, and to be significantly more profitable,” van Raemdonck said. “It is also going to demonstrate that we have ample liquidity to operate and fund the business, as well as generate free cash flow to invest in the business over the next five years. That’s what this business plan will be detailing.”

“What’s changed over the last two months is that we have $1.75 billion of committed capital. We have $825 million that we’ve received, and we are receiving another $300 million in a matter of days or weeks. It’s really, really close…When we entered the [bankruptcy] process, we received DIP (debtor-in-possession) financing and we put in a topline revenue budget and a budget for receiving inventory, and we are exceeding both the revenue budget and the amount of inventory we are receiving, which is very encouraging.

“Yes, we had a problem of liquidity,” van Raemdonck admitted. “It led to a problem of inventory and performance. That was the summary of last year. The summary of this year is we are through a financial restructuring that gives us access to liquidity and allows us to refocus the business on the most valuable assets we have, and when we emerge later this year, we will be able to perform at the level we want.”
Inventory Flowing In
While there’s no guarantee that Saks Global successfully emerges from bankruptcy this year, van Raemdonck, while being interviewed from the Brookfield Place headquarters of Saks Global in lower Manhattan, cited progress in the court proceedings, and expressed gratitude that many designers and brands have either continued or resumed shipping the luxury retailer. He said brands have committed to close to $1.3 billion of inventory.
“That’s 80 percent of the [spring] season that we need to have. And that number is growing week by week,” he said. “I was looking at our receipts this month — they’re up 63 percent compared to last year, and from February to this month to date, we are up 15 percent… We have many, many brands, but if you take our top 100 or 200 brands, none have said they’re not going to do business with us going forward. Brands are really catching up very fast and supporting us. I don’t take that for granted. We need — and we are — actively rebuilding their trust.”

“Yes, we had a problem of liquidity,” van Raemdonck admitted. “It led to a problem of inventory and performance. That was the summary of last year. The summary of this year is we are through a financial restructuring that gives us access to liquidity and allows us to refocus the business on the most valuable assets we have, and when we emerge later this year, we will be able to perform at the level we want.”
Inventory Flowing In
While there’s no guarantee that Saks Global successfully emerges from bankruptcy this year, van Raemdonck, while being interviewed from the Brookfield Place headquarters of Saks Global in lower Manhattan, cited progress in the court proceedings, and expressed gratitude that many designers and brands have either continued or resumed shipping the luxury retailer. He said brands have committed to close to $1.3 billion of inventory.
“That’s 80 percent of the [spring] season that we need to have. And that number is growing week by week,” he said. “I was looking at our receipts this month — they’re up 63 percent compared to last year, and from February to this month to date, we are up 15 percent… We have many, many brands, but if you take our top 100 or 200 brands, none have said they’re not going to do business with us going forward. Brands are really catching up very fast and supporting us. I don’t take that for granted. We need — and we are — actively rebuilding their trust.”

Saks Global has indicated that post-petition invoices for merchandise receipts will be paid pursuant to current terms, which are set at 90 days from receipt of goods, though payment terms can vary by brand. It’s expected that if and when Saks Global emerges from bankruptcy, payment terms would revert to those that were in place prior to Saks Global’s acquisition of Neiman Marcus Group, though a schedule for paying vendors must be approved by the bankruptcy court judge. Thirty- to 60-day payment terms are the industry standard.
Under Saks Global’s prior regime, the company largely lost the support of the fashion industry due to its failure to pay bills for several seasons and a host of unmet promises. Consequently, the stores were depleted of merchandise, market share was lost, and competitors, most notably Bloomingdale’s and Nordstrom, have been taking advantage of the situation by aggressively working to add designers they did not previously sell, and provide more space in their stores to certain designers that they already did sell.

But at Saks Global, much has happened in the two months since going bankrupt to obtain financing to replenish inventories and maintain operations and set a new foundation for a potentially more viable — and streamlined — future.
It’s expected that through a debt-for-equity swap, key bondholders, including Pentwater Capital and Bracebridge Capital leading the lending group arranging a $1.75 billion financing package for Saks Global in bankruptcy, will become owners in Saks Global. In effect, Saks Global will become a new debt-free or near debt-free company post bankruptcy. Hudson Bay Co., Amazon, Authentic Brands Group, and G-III all had equity stakes in Saks Global going into the bankruptcy, but it’s anticipated they will see the value of those shares slip away in the court-led process.

Chapter 11 bankruptcy enables a retailer to get out of leases without penalty. Saks Global is closing 20 Saks Fifth Avenuestores, leaving just 13 operating, including the Fifth Avenue flagship in Manhattan, and shutting four Neiman Marcus units, leaving 32 operating. In addition, Saks Fifth Avenue was pulled off Amazon.com; one distribution center was closed, leaving three operating, though three others were closed pre-bankruptcy, leaving the company with its newest facilities that provide better service, and 57 Saks Off 5th stores are being shuttered, leaving just 12 for the time being. Saks Global has also shut down the Horchow catalogue and the five Last Call clearance centers for Neiman Marcus.

Saks Global volume was listed at about $7.3 billion shortly after the Neiman’s acquisition in fiscal 2024, before the streamlining.
Saks Global executives leave open the possibility that a few more Saks or Neiman’s stores could close.
There has been speculation of asset sales, including Bergdorf Goodman. Asked about that, van Raemdonck replied: “We are always going to continue to look at the footprint, the assets, we have. That’s normal course of business. But today, there are no active conversations about any asset sales.”

Upon going bankrupt, a new management team was set with a blend of senior executives from Saks Fifth Avenue and Neiman Marcus. Van Raemdonck became CEO of Saks Global in January, after sitting on the sidelines of luxury retailing for a year. He had been CEO of the Neiman Marcus Group for nearly seven years until it was purchased by Saks Global.

“I came back because I have a belief in what Saks Global can be, and I’m confident that we can emerge as a strong business,” van Raemdonck told WWD. “What you’re seeing is someone who is very matter-of-fact and very confident. I didn’t have to do this. But I did this out of belief that Saks Global will be successful, and I’m willing to put my reputation on the line.”
Van Raemdonck said he believes combining Saks Fifth Avenue and the Neiman Marcus Group into Saks Global is a good idea. “The merger made a lot of sense to me, because by bringing the two best players in the industry that have three banners [Saks, Neiman’s and Bergdorf’s] you get to attain a certain level of scale and synergies that help your overall profitability and ability to invest.”

Cost Savings
Navigating through the bankruptcy is further challenged by the ongoing systems integrations and consolidations initiated when Saks Global bought NMG for $2.7 billion in December 2024. The goal has been to achieve hundreds of millions of dollars in cost savings by centralizing and eliminating duplicative functions, such as accounting, planning, human resources, legal and distribution facilities. There is now one buying team for Neiman’s and Saks, and one marketing team serving Bergdorf’s, Neiman’s, and Saks. Bergdorf’s has its own buying team. Savings will also be attained through store closings, leading to layoffs and payroll reductions.

Aside from cost savings, the combined business should benefit from access to greater data, sharing best practices, enhanced personalization, and increased use of AI. Merging loyalty programs is a possibility. For example, using each retailer’s credit cards to shop could earn points valid at both Saks and Neiman’s. Or spending enough at either store could lead to access to invitation-only events at both Saks and Neiman’s.
Van Raemdonck described Saks Fifth Avenue and Neiman Marcus as the same yet different — both operating as multibrand luxury retailers but doing it in different ways.
“Neiman Marcus has been a relationship business and very focused on omnichannel, and on wholesale, and the metric of success was profitability,” he said. “Saks was a business that was focused on growth, on digital, and adopted the marketplace format much more, and it didn’t have the same level of profitability,” van Raemdonck said.

“They were both were operating with distinct strategies that resonated with the customer, but with a different impact on profitability and generation of cash flow.”
Sources have told WWD that among true luxury brands — such as Chanel, Dior, and Giorgio Armani — there’s been about 90 percent overlap between Saks and Neiman’s. But Saks has been emphasizing a wider range of categories and price points, attracting a broader demographic, and has been aggressive trying to build business online. Saks stores house many more leased designer shops than Neiman’s, which has long been reluctant to open leased shops but in recent seasons has opened some.
By virtue of its Fifth Avenue flagship being a major tourist attraction, Saks has more international recognition than Neiman’s. In fiscal 2025, the flagship saw nearly 3 million shoppers from over 150 countries, and generated three times the amount of business as the largest Neiman Marcus stores, according to Saks Global.
As van Raemdonck pointed out, Neiman’s has maintained its focus on its wealthiest customers, through exclusive offerings, personal service and VIP-type events. Neiman’s has a track record of providing deeper, broader assortments of each of the top luxury collections it sells, and has a stronger selling culture than Saks.
Differentiating the Banners
Regarding the future of Saks and Neiman’s, van Raemdonck said, “We want to separate and differentiate them. As a point of reference, if you take the six markets where Saks and Neiman’s are either in the same mall, or across the street like in Beverly Hills, the overlapping customer is between 10 and 15 percent which [means] the customer is telling us they’re different brands. And in the future, we want to make them even more different, so that there’s a reason to shop in both of them, or to be deeply loyal with one of them.”

Asked how that’s accomplished, van Raemdonck said, “It’s in the positioning. It’s in the expression, in the assortment, and it can be the same brands [sold at both stores], but the assortment should be slightly different,” meaning each having a different merchandise edit.
“The Saks customer likes to express herself through fashion, but she needs a little bit more guidance in choosing the fashion that is right for her,” van Raemdonck said. “The Neiman’s customer is a fashion customer who has her own sense of taste, loves color, and loves newness, and so their way of approaching the same element of fashion and newness is slightly different.”
Discussing Saks Global overall, van Raemdonck boasted, “We have the largest base of highly engaged luxury customers. Fifty to 60 percent of our sales are with customers who shop seven to nine times a year with us, depending on the retail banner. They spend more than $5,000 with us, and we retain more than 80 percent of them. Forty percent of our sales come from customers who spend $10,000 or more with us. And so the majority of our sales are from loyal customers and when you shop seven to nine times a year, you’re deeply loyal. We have a retention rate of 90 percent from top customers.”
One of the big challenges in a bankruptcy is retaining employees and communicating to all constituencies concerned that the company isn’t disappearing and has a future, even in a downsized state.
“We are doing this very, very frequently and very openly, because transparency is critical,” van Raemdonck said. “This morning I was talking with our employees in Bangalore. We have a whole team there that supports us across all functions,” including creative, planning, merchandising and payroll functions. “This Monday, we had what we call an ‘All Access,’ meeting which is our all-employee town hall. We call it All Access because everyone gets a front row seat [it’s a virtual meeting] and everyone gets access to the information.” It’s a monthly event. “And then we meet with our leadership council, the top 50 people in the organization, every other week. And every week, we talk with the ad hoc group of creditors, and we are meeting in person with the unsecured creditor committee [Thursday] to share with them our business plans. So the communication is very, very frequent. We communicate with brands on a very frequent basis, at my level, and then Lana [Todorovich, chief global brands partnerships officer] is with the brands on a daily basis.

“We have more than 1,500 sales associates who sell at least $1 million per year and in aggregate deliver more than $2.8 billion of revenue,” the CEO added. “Over the last 12 months, our attrition rate amongst top sellers that sell more than $3 million annually is in the low-single digits.”

https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/companies/ford-is-no-longer-american-ford-just-became-a-landlord-for-geely-to-hide-its-own-tech-bankruptcy/ar-AA1XArQi?ocid=finance-verthp-feeds

Ssense reported 215 layoffs last month to the Quebec government. This brings the total to 307 layoffs over the past year. The luxury online retailer filed for bankruptcy protection in August. Founders recently received court approval to buy back the company. Lenders opposed the buyout, favoring liquidation for debt recovery.

Montreal, Quebec

https://montrealgazette.com/business/local-business/ssense-reported-over-200-layoffs-last-month-to-quebec-government

Sadly, I have fallen behind on medical bills and credit card balances are almost maxed out. Does the company monitor this type of thing— associates pursuing bankruptcy or debt settlement ?

First Brands Group is closing its distribution facility in Patterson, California, resulting in 98 layoffs, with the majority occurring on April 4, 2026, and the remainder on April 30, 2026. This closure follows the company's September 2025 Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing and federal fraud indictments against executives, contributing to over 2,500 nationwide layoffs. Read the full story at KCRA: https://www.kcra.com/article/stanislaus-county-layoff-first-brands-group-closes-facility-patterson/70563533

First Brands Group announced a plant closure. This closure will result in approximately 275 layoffs. The facility is located in Greenville. A bankruptcy filing caused the plant closure. Alleged fraud and money laundering led to the bankruptcy.

https://www.bizjournals.com/dayton/news/2026/03/02/greenville-fram-facility-closure-275-layoffs-warn.html

First Brands Group will close its western distribution center in Patterson. This closure will result in 98 job losses for workers. Ninety-one employees will be laid off on April 4. The remaining seven employees will lose their jobs on April 30. The company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy last September amid fraud accusations against former executives.

https://www.kcra.com/article/stanislaus-county-layoff-first-brands-group-closes-facility-patterson/70563533

After clownish all hand call yesterday, the stock price getting to 7.64, recent layoffs, is there any hope for Voyix or will we witness its demise in 2026?

I never thought I'd see the day. What are the chances Sabre goes bankrupt?

As a former senior engineer at CDW I can say without a doubt that the company is in serious trouble. I made six figures basically doing nothing because internal politics prevented me from receiving projects.

While it was great for a time, I realized my skills were degrading and jumped ship for another opportunity. Thanks CDW for the free money and certifications!😂😂

Fitch Ratings upgraded Avaya's Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'B-' from 'CCC+' and its first-lien term loan to 'B+' (RR2) in November 2025, driven by a stable outlook, successful post-bankruptcy financial restructuring, improved profitability, and a reduced debt burden

The recent news about the joint venture of TPG, states that IPCo (A bankruptcy mechanism organization) now owns Xerox IPO.

In the new agreement there is a revenue covenant clause, that states certain thresholds for maintaining branded revenue (Excludes Lexmark, Fittle etc.)

The thresholds are as follows:
June 30: $2.578B
September 30: $3.852B
December 31: $5.225B

If Xerox fails to meet these revenue tresholds, the SSLA requires IPCo to initiate an event of default.

In otherwords, if Xerox does not meet the $5.225B brand line revenue in 2026 they will be going into default.

In 2025 Xerox did roughly $5.5B in brand line revenue. In other words: Does the brand line revenue decline with more than 5% this year again a default event will happen.

With the mass layoffs, mainly on the Xerox side, this is highly likely to happen.

In other words, we are now within the last 12 months.

This comment on another post [Post ID: @OP+1kh9rs9x2] is a very good factual summary. I like how the OG poster explained how/why/what/when that led to the Chapter 11 and going Private. Pretty stunned that, despite all the verifiable facts and SEC Filings that some people still believe (see comments) the Chapter 11 was a choice and that Alan Masarek had any other option available to him. Jim Chicago & Kieran McGrath were protected by the Chapter 11 Filing. If not, they would not have escaped criminal charges brought by the SEC (note -- different than civil suits they have escaped). Avaya would have liquidated without the chapter 11 due to the irregularities in the SEC filings.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++
August 9, 2022 SEC 12b-25
NOTIFICATION OF LATE FILING

"Furthermore, and separately [from the delayed 10-Q SEC Earnings Report Filing] the Audit Committee has also commenced an internal investigation to review matters related to a whistleblower letter that remains ongoing"

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1418100/000141810022000083/formnt10-q3q22.htm

Apollo and it's army of organizations that conspire to take over companies "stepped in" by creating an entrapment to force Alan Masarek's hand into allowing the Chapter 11 so they could steal equity and take Avaya private.

TIMELINE REMINDER

1. The Subscription game-- which was a risky short-term strategy to falsely inflate the Market Valuation of Avaya so the greedy BoD and C-Suite could sell Avaya for north of $5b -- caught up to them and they had nowhere to hide in March 2022. Now IF they could book an enormous deal they could have extended the charade for another few quarters. That deal was to be Wells Fargo, if memory serves. So they delayed earnings in hopes to find an accounting workaround to explain away the unexplainable math that was the earnings reality. NOTE -- They spent since late 2019 fudging the numbers based on an algorithm of subscription-economy math that assumed a set value for each base client multiplied by market potential for signing the base clients to a subscription plan. THESE WERE NOT REAL #'s!!! For many quarters they could escape scrutiny b/c maintenance contracts were still collecting money. But when the first round of the 3 yr subscription deals were up, they were left with evaporated maintenance deals and accelerated client departures. It was one large empty hole.
   In May 2022, the situation hit severe crisis status. There was no explaining away the #s. They needed more than just one enormous deal. The Slippery Slope Subscription game was now a runaway train. The BoD knew they needed something extreme to buy time to avoid being exposed for the 3.5 yr con-game of pretending that the marketing soundbytes of the "subscription economy" translated into real revenue. They initiated the age-old strategy of the CEO-Shuffle and began an aggressive search to name a new CEO before they had to face yet another SEC filing delay. They begin talks with Masarek in May. Hire him in June. Announce him in July. Masarek is up for the challenge and confident he can stabilize Avaya by December .....HOWEVER

2. Apollo Global deploys a leveraged lending takeover plan. It was an unofficial hostile takeover. They are able to secure some of the leveraged lending related to Avaya loans, yet not enough to execute a hostile takeover. So they instead devise a plan to make things so uncomfortable for Avaya leadership that they will just give in. They deploy their go-to auditing firms and dirty PR spin-doctors to both a) find dirt on Avaya to use as leverage; and b) entrap Avaya via auditing. This included names like Alix Partners.

3. August 2022 -- Internal Audit discloses that Avaya lacked Internal Controls due to a broken process of formally investigating Ethics and Corporate Compliance reports. One example was a "Whistleblower" which filed a formal complaint months (maybe even a year) prior questioning accounting documentation of subscription deals and the risk to the overall business. At the time of the report, it was Shefali Shah's responsibility to ensure the complaint was properly and formally investigated. Instead, it was never even pursued. The independent auditing firm identified the breach of protocol that must be followed by any publicly traded company. Therefore, they were obligated by law to report the breach of protocol to the SEC in their next "we still can't file earnings" extension filing. This is called an "ICFR Weakness
   November 28, 2022 SEC FORM 8-K Avaya Admits to Lack of Internal Controls based on result of investigation. This essentially states that they violated SEC Rules by not pursuing the whistleblower complaint, however stops short that the complaint itself qualified as a whistleblower concern. "The deficiencies in internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) represented “material weaknesses,” the cloud technology company said in a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
   Avaya discloses ICFR weaknesses linked to whistleblower logs Compliance Week

https://www.complianceweek.com/accounting-and-auditing/avaya-discloses-icfr-weaknesses-linked-to-whistleblower-logs/32407.article

1. DECEMBER 2022 Apollo now believes they have Avaya cornered to give in to a Chapter 11 so they could go private and Apollo can deploy their tried and true law firms to manage the filing in their favor. Yet Alan Masarek was not giving in. So Apollo spent December 2022 maneuvering to force AMs hands. The end result of paying AM $10m ($6 m retention bonus so he would stay despite looming bankruptcy & $4m of his original sign-on bonus that he was required to use to buy Avaya shares. They waived that requirement and he was allowed to keep the money as cash. They also awarded Shefali Shah $1.2m as they needed her to help them go after Jim Chirico if that was necessary.

Avaya CEO To Get $6 Million Cash Award As Potential Bankruptcy Looms https://www.channelfutures.com/regulation-compliance/avaya-ceo-to-get-6-million-cash-award-stock-falls-below-nyse-minimum

SO @ab IS SPOT IN. THE WHISTLEBLOWER WAS REAL. IT WAS THE Everything. without that Whistleblower report Internal Controls Snafu, Apollo wouldn't have had the chance to deploy their gremlins to force AM into a takeover (also known as conspired Chapter 11).

Oregon's small business bankruptcies reached a 12-year high in 2025. Approximately 250 businesses filed for bankruptcy protection statewide. This surge reflects a national trend driven by higher interest rates and rising costs. Layoffs at large employers like Intel and Nike also affected the local economy. Smaller firms and nonprofits face financial stress, including unpaid invoices.

https://hoodline.com/2026/02/layoffs-pile-up-as-portland-biz-bankruptcies-soar-to-12-year-high/

Bankruptcy is almost inevitable at this point. I can’t believe how quickly things turned so sour. I hate to say it, but QVC and, by extension, HSN, seem headed down the same path as Blockbuster and other companies that served their purpose but became outdated and faded out. It’s probably time to start looking for a new job.

honest question

A Texas judge ordered Chapter 11 trustees for Kentucky Owl and Stoli bankruptcies. Lender Fifth Third Bank successfully argued for an orderly sale of 35,000 bourbon barrels. This approach aims to maximize recovery for creditors over immediate liquidation. The wider bourbon industry faces a downturn, impacting several companies. Major brands like Brown-Forman and Diageo have announced layoffs due to declining sales.

https://www.kentucky.com/lexgoeat/bourbon/article314595107.html

Robert Bearden Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. The trucking carrier submitted its voluntary petition on January 26. Court records show the company listed between 1 and 49 creditors. Assets and liabilities were estimated between $0 and $50,000. Drivers were reportedly instructed to return company trucks.

https://www.freightwaves.com/news/georgia-based-carrier-with-128-drivers-files-for-chapter-11-bankruptcy

50% sure they will announce chapter 7 restructure.

We have had too many years to fix the company but nothing has changed only more bad decisions by management and quality/recall issues by engineers. I feel like we are going to be the next sears. I wonder which company will buy the new corporate buildings in Dearborn few years from now. Very sad story indeed. Thanks Farley and the rest of the executive leadership team for this…

Eddie Bauer faces expected bankruptcy. Recent layoffs preceded this. The layoffs happened at the company's headquarters. Bankruptcy is now anticipated. These two events are linked.

https://www.bizjournals.com/twincities/news/2026/02/03/eddie-bauer-prepares-chapter-11-filing.html

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Thank you. Also included thoughts, reasoning to back answer.

I can't believe they waited until the end of the day to start the walkouts. 3 so far when they got to me. I hope they can actually afford the severance they offered.

Francesca's, a women's fashion retailer, will close all its stores. The company filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. It plans to liquidate all inventory. Going-out-of-business sales are currently underway. This decision follows a lender default notice and lost investor funding.

ttps://www.shreveporttimes.com/story/news/2026/01/29/is-francescas-closing-stores-in-louisiana-retailer-filed-for-bankruptcy-going-out-of-business-sales/88412473007/

... when it's talking about the 100th anniversary of its IPO. Is that even a thing? Has any other publicly traded century old company -- GE, GM, Coca-Cola, etc. -- ever "celebrated" its IPO? (What about the years when NCR was part of AT&T, shouldn't that be excluded? Current management probably doesn't even know about that.) How much did management spend on this NYC junket?! Did David and Eric come back?!

This company is in very bad shape. James Kelly's strategy is to load the company up with payments-related bells and whistles and sell it to Global Payments. But the payments industry -- any company that isn't Visa or Mastercard -- has also become a commodity.. Nobody's going to buy this dog, unless it's out of bankruptcy.

The way things are going, that just might happen.

Xerox is not announcing Chapter 11, but it is clearly working hard to avoid it.

The company is handing out free warrants to shareholders and bondholders as a way to quietly re-engineer its balance sheet before things get worse.

This is an out-of-court, shareholder-inclusive, quasi-restructuring tool designed to reduce debt without filing for Chapter 11, while neutralizing lawsuits and buying time.

In other words: advanced financial engineering designed to keep control out of a bankruptcy court.

If the business stabilizes and the stock recovers, those warrants can be used to turn debt into shares, cutting leverage without burning cash.

If the recovery never comes, the warrants expire and nothing happens... except that Xerox might still be standing.

Behind all the financial and investment jargon, don't lose sight of what's really important:

Management is fully aware of how close we are to filing for Chapter 11 and is using the last tricks in the book before being forced to do so.

This move doesn’t mean that bankruptcy is happening tomorrow, but it does mean the current capital structure is extremely fragile and time is a crucial factor.

In short: this is about survival, control, and avoiding the kind of court-driven restructuring in which senior management (yes, the people architecting this measure) lose all influence.

After the first bankruptcy where Neimans stiffed creditors or paid only 1.7 cents to 36 cents on the dollar. Raemdinck was there when we didn't pay 2.667 billion to them. Now he is back. Where he will Play games on what you are owed... Then claim it is the court.ya right. Vendors don't want to take losses again while he just got 7 million. The blood Letting continues

High street shops Claire’s and The Original Factory Shop are going into administration, which could put about 2,500 jobs at risk. Claire’s, which is well known for selling accessories to young people, had been looking for a buyer after its American owner went bankrupt last year. Modella Capital, which owns both stores, said the businesses will enter insolvency proceedings in the UK and Ireland.

https://www.costar.com/article/799870821/mall-giant-simon-seeks-to-scrap-two-saks-global-store-leases
https://www.retaildive.com/news/saks-off-5th-online-liquidating-five-years-after-split-brick-and-mortar/810454/
Link to the video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZajAA1Ip5mg

https://www.crn.com/news/ai/2026/ibm-q4-earnings-preview-5-things-to-know

Simon wasn't paid rent..filed for eviction before the bankruptcy. Wants them gone. That would only leave Nordstrom in town

Record profits and I got my walking papers today as a senior engineer. Dozens of others too! Go Bank of India!

600 full time jobs & 800 to 900 seasonal jobs will be lost.

The company filed BK recently.

Link to the article: https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/14/saks-global-files-for-bankruptcy-protection.html
Link to the video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xLbYeI7vvw4

Link to the article: https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/14/saks-global-files-for-bankruptcy-protection.html
Link to the video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xLbYeI7vvw4

source: https://therobinreport.com/saks-global-another-trainwreck/

01.07.26: The Robin Report: Saks Global: Another Trainwreck by Mark Cohen

Saks Global is Richard Baker’s next and maybe his final retail failure. Lord & Taylor, The Hudson Bay Company in all its various iterations in Canada and Europe, and now the monstrosity he recently created by putting Saks Fifth Avenue, Saks Off Fifth, Neiman Marcus and Bergdorf Goodman together, teeters on bankruptcy. This recent disaster is the result of the company’s failure to make a required $100 million interest payment to lenders at year’s end.

Baker, as a real estate manipulator, gets high marks. As a retail leader and retail strategist, however, he has been an abject failure.

Baker Shadow Play

Baker suddenly appeared on the retail scene in 2006 when his real estate company, NRDC, bought Lord & Taylor from the newly branded Federated/Macy’s Corporation, which inherited L&T when it acquired May Company stores. Then, in 2008, Baker acquired control of The Hudson Bay Company following the untimely death of its majority shareholder. Three years later, in 2011, Baker’s HBC sold its Zeller’s stores in Canada to Target Corporation for $1.8 billion. Kudos to Baker, as most of the Zeller’s store locations were arguably worthless as hapless Target would soon find out.

When I was Director of Retail Studies at the Columbia Business School, I attended a student-led Retail and Luxury Goods Conference in 2012, keynoted by Baker. He gave a rambling off the cuff 40-minute presentation in which he regaled the 250 students and guests in the audience about how great it was to be rich; how he did little work at Wharton having surrounded himself with “good looking babes” eager to do his work; and how he had just “stolen” Lord & Taylor from Federated for $1.2 billion. Narcissism aside, he was likely correct in his view that Federated could not wait to unload L&T as an outlying May Company property. He went on to talk about how easy it was to master the art of merchandising based on his exposure to L&T’s business. Completely put off by this performance, I was unfortunately seated in a location that precluded me from leaving early.

Next in 2013, Baker acquired Saks Fifth Avenue and Saks Off Fifth stores in what might be described as another triumph of price over value. Saks’ management had failed to fully recognize the leverage it could have used on its own behalf based on its Fifth Avenue store’s real estate valuation. Baker, as a real estate manipulator, gets high marks. As a retail leader and retail strategist, however, he has been an abject failure. His stewardship of Lord & Taylor was pathetic.

In an effort to cut expenses, he attempted to rationalize back-of-the-house activities between Canada-based Bay stores and American-based L&T stores, which may have made sense to some clueless consultant but never worked in retail reality. He then came up with a scheme to downsize the L&T Fifth Avenue flagship and sold the building to that other paragon of business strategy, WeWork, eventually ki-ling the L&T brand.

Baker and The Bay

The disruption and ultimate liquidation of The Bay’s principal competitor in apparel, accessories and soft home, Sears Canada, should have resulted in a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity, but The Bay failed to capitalize on it.

Moving Saks Fifth Avenue stores into The Bay stores spaces in Canada and introducing Saks Off Fifth in Canada was another failed initiative. In fact, moving Saks Fifth Avenue into a cavernous “low-brow” Bay location on Queen Street adjacent to the Eaton Center in Toronto was an incredible misstep in and of itself. The physical space was available, but the luxury customer certainly wasn’t there.

Opening over a dozen Bay department stores in the Netherlands in 2017 was another bone-headed move. Baker did a complex deal with Germany-based Galeria Karstadt Kaufhof, securing retail space in the Netherlands, but again the customer just wasn’t there. Allegedly, Baker believed that since the Canadian Army liberated the Netherlands from the Na-is at the end of WWII, the Dutch would welcome a Canadian company with open arms. It didn’t happen. The Dutch Bay stores were all closed by 2019. The customers who might have remembered being liberated in 1945 were either dead or too old to patronize a Canadian-owned department store. Baker claimed he made money on this ridiculous foray, and he may very well have, but the Dutch paid a terrible price for this catastrophe.

Baker Business Model

In 2024, Baker set his sights on acquiring Sak’s principal competitor, Neiman Marcus/Bergdorf Goodman. The timing wasn’t great. There was the disappearance of luxury competitor Barney’s, and the Saks business at best treaded water. Also, Neiman Marcus/Bergdorf Goodman was struggling to put a challenging Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceeding behind it.

There was also the monetization of hbc.com and saks.com, which raised a considerable amount of money from a group of hapless investors. These investors did not realize how completely counterproductive this strategy would prove to be.

Along the way, Richard Baker has presided over a never-ending list of lead executives, many of whom barely lasted two years with the company. There was Tina Johnson, Jeff Sherman, Bonnie Brooks, Jerry Storch, and Helena Foulkes, among others. And then there was Marc Metrick, whose 30-year tenure with Saks has just come to an abrupt end. But maybe it was 30 years too long. Metrick was a planning executive at Saks who, in recent years, masqueraded as its lead merchant.

Debt Economics

The history of two weak and/or weakened retail companies merging and finding success is simply this: There is no history. Add to that the non-starter of two companies that essentially do business with the same customer and in many cases in the same geographic locations. But these hurdles didn’t stop Baker from consummating a debt-laden merger of two icons. And incomprehensibly, for well over a year, the company failed to pay many of Saks’ vendors either on time or in many cases at all. So, now both companies have just completed a poor 2025 in sales. And having been cut off from receiving fresh inventory by a cynical factor community, Saks Global just failed to make that $100 million year-end interest payment.

Baker in Bankruptcy

Maybe Baker will come up with a bundle of new cash. If business remains as poor as it has been, any new cash infusion would only be a stopgap measure. Alternatively, the company might come up with a prepackaged restructuring agreement with its creditors. Or it will surrender to a voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy proceeding.

I’m not a bankruptcy attorney, but having lived through Federated department store’s successful restructure, and an up close and personal experience with Bradlees stores eventual failed emergence from bankruptcy, I think the bell may soon toll for Saks Global.

If it files for Chapter 11 financial relief, creditors organize and line up based upon their preexisting credit agreements (or lack thereof). Secured creditors, typically the company’s lenders, rely on collateral rights while unsecured creditors, typically vendors and service providers, hope for some eventual relief through the bankruptcy process. All payables from the company, whether current or past due, are frozen.

In a bankruptcy, legal and financial restructuring professionals line up for a typically substantial fee opportunity. A new lender or a consortium of lenders emerges to provide Debtor in Possession funding to enable the company to stay upright while in bankruptcy. All vendors are asked to resume shipping based on the newly created surety of DIP financing.

But, lacking confidence that past due receivables will eventually be paid, many vendors resort to selling their company receivables to distressed debt (or vulture) investors for substantial discounted values. This, in my opinion, is a terrible flaw in the bankruptcy process in that unsecured vendors, who you would expect to have a stake in the company’s eventual successful emergence from bankruptcy, have now traded places with investors seeking a fast financial return.

Saks Global at Risk

If Sak’s Global were operating as a stable platform with a successful sales and margin track record, with capable senior leadership, a reliable operating strategy, and good relationships with its vendors and customers, there would be ample reason for the company to navigate through bankruptcy and emerge with new debt and a newly restructured balance sheet. But none of this appears to be the case. As 2026 unfolds to what will undoubtedly be a challenging year for all retailers, the prospects for Saks Global are truly grim. My sense is that many vendors long ago stopped shipping or have curtailed their support for Saks, Neiman Marcus and maybe even Bergdorf Goodman, and they are unlikely to get back on board after having been egregiously abused these past few years.

Many will find another retailer to serve their customers if they haven’t already done so or continue to build a direct-to-consumer model of their own. Why wouldn’t they? Who needs the sturm und drang of a failing retail partner who doesn’t pay its bills? If that happens, Saks Global is toast.

source: https://therobinreport.com/saks-global-another-trainwreck/

01.07.26: The Robin Report: Saks Global: Another Trainwreck by Mark Cohen

Saks Global is Richard Baker’s next and maybe his final retail failure. Lord & Taylor, The Hudson Bay Company in all its various iterations in Canada and Europe, and now the monstrosity he recently created by putting Saks Fifth Avenue, Saks Off Fifth, Neiman Marcus and Bergdorf Goodman together, teeters on bankruptcy. This recent disaster is the result of the company’s failure to make a required $100 million interest payment to lenders at year’s end.

Baker, as a real estate manipulator, gets high marks. As a retail leader and retail strategist, however, he has been an abject failure.

Baker Shadow Play

Baker suddenly appeared on the retail scene in 2006 when his real estate company, NRDC, bought Lord & Taylor from the newly branded Federated/Macy’s Corporation, which inherited L&T when it acquired May Company stores. Then, in 2008, Baker acquired control of The Hudson Bay Company following the untimely death of its majority shareholder. Three years later, in 2011, Baker’s HBC sold its Zeller’s stores in Canada to Target Corporation for $1.8 billion. Kudos to Baker, as most of the Zeller’s store locations were arguably worthless as hapless Target would soon find out.

When I was Director of Retail Studies at the Columbia Business School, I attended a student-led Retail and Luxury Goods Conference in 2012, keynoted by Baker. He gave a rambling off the cuff 40-minute presentation in which he regaled the 250 students and guests in the audience about how great it was to be rich; how he did little work at Wharton having surrounded himself with “good looking babes” eager to do his work; and how he had just “stolen” Lord & Taylor from Federated for $1.2 billion. Narcissism aside, he was likely correct in his view that Federated could not wait to unload L&T as an outlying May Company property. He went on to talk about how easy it was to master the art of merchandising based on his exposure to L&T’s business. Completely put off by this performance, I was unfortunately seated in a location that precluded me from leaving early.

Next in 2013, Baker acquired Saks Fifth Avenue and Saks Off Fifth stores in what might be described as another triumph of price over value. Saks’ management had failed to fully recognize the leverage it could have used on its own behalf based on its Fifth Avenue store’s real estate valuation. Baker, as a real estate manipulator, gets high marks. As a retail leader and retail strategist, however, he has been an abject failure. His stewardship of Lord & Taylor was pathetic.

In an effort to cut expenses, he attempted to rationalize back-of-the-house activities between Canada-based Bay stores and American-based L&T stores, which may have made sense to some clueless consultant but never worked in retail reality. He then came up with a scheme to downsize the L&T Fifth Avenue flagship and sold the building to that other paragon of business strategy, WeWork, eventually ki-ling the L&T brand.

Baker and The Bay

The disruption and ultimate liquidation of The Bay’s principal competitor in apparel, accessories and soft home, Sears Canada, should have resulted in a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity, but The Bay failed to capitalize on it.

Moving Saks Fifth Avenue stores into The Bay stores spaces in Canada and introducing Saks Off Fifth in Canada was another failed initiative. In fact, moving Saks Fifth Avenue into a cavernous “low-brow” Bay location on Queen Street adjacent to the Eaton Center in Toronto was an incredible misstep in and of itself. The physical space was available, but the luxury customer certainly wasn’t there.

Opening over a dozen Bay department stores in the Netherlands in 2017 was another bone-headed move. Baker did a complex deal with Germany-based Galeria Karstadt Kaufhof, securing retail space in the Netherlands, but again the customer just wasn’t there. Allegedly, Baker believed that since the Canadian Army liberated the Netherlands from the Na-is at the end of WWII, the Dutch would welcome a Canadian company with open arms. It didn’t happen. The Dutch Bay stores were all closed by 2019. The customers who might have remembered being liberated in 1945 were either dead or too old to patronize a Canadian-owned department store. Baker claimed he made money on this ridiculous foray, and he may very well have, but the Dutch paid a terrible price for this catastrophe.

Baker Business Model

In 2024, Baker set his sights on acquiring Sak’s principal competitor, Neiman Marcus/Bergdorf Goodman. The timing wasn’t great. There was the disappearance of luxury competitor Barney’s, and the Saks business at best treaded water. Also, Neiman Marcus/Bergdorf Goodman was struggling to put a challenging Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceeding behind it.

There was also the monetization of hbc.com and saks.com, which raised a considerable amount of money from a group of hapless investors. These investors did not realize how completely counterproductive this strategy would prove to be.

Along the way, Richard Baker has presided over a never-ending list of lead executives, many of whom barely lasted two years with the company. There was Tina Johnson, Jeff Sherman, Bonnie Brooks, Jerry Storch, and Helena Foulkes, among others. And then there was Marc Metrick, whose 30-year tenure with Saks has just come to an abrupt end. But maybe it was 30 years too long. Metrick was a planning executive at Saks who, in recent years, masqueraded as its lead merchant.

Debt Economics

The history of two weak and/or weakened retail companies merging and finding success is simply this: There is no history. Add to that the non-starter of two companies that essentially do business with the same customer and in many cases in the same geographic locations. But these hurdles didn’t stop Baker from consummating a debt-laden merger of two icons. And incomprehensibly, for well over a year, the company failed to pay many of Saks’ vendors either on time or in many cases at all. So, now both companies have just completed a poor 2025 in sales. And having been cut off from receiving fresh inventory by a cynical factor community, Saks Global just failed to make that $100 million year-end interest payment.

Baker in Bankruptcy

Maybe Baker will come up with a bundle of new cash. If business remains as poor as it has been, any new cash infusion would only be a stopgap measure. Alternatively, the company might come up with a prepackaged restructuring agreement with its creditors. Or it will surrender to a voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy proceeding.

I’m not a bankruptcy attorney, but having lived through Federated department store’s successful restructure, and an up close and personal experience with Bradlees stores eventual failed emergence from bankruptcy, I think the bell may soon toll for Saks Global.

If it files for Chapter 11 financial relief, creditors organize and line up based upon their preexisting credit agreements (or lack thereof). Secured creditors, typically the company’s lenders, rely on collateral rights while unsecured creditors, typically vendors and service providers, hope for some eventual relief through the bankruptcy process. All payables from the company, whether current or past due, are frozen.

In a bankruptcy, legal and financial restructuring professionals line up for a typically substantial fee opportunity. A new lender or a consortium of lenders emerges to provide Debtor in Possession funding to enable the company to stay upright while in bankruptcy. All vendors are asked to resume shipping based on the newly created surety of DIP financing.

But, lacking confidence that past due receivables will eventually be paid, many vendors resort to selling their company receivables to distressed debt (or vulture) investors for substantial discounted values. This, in my opinion, is a terrible flaw in the bankruptcy process in that unsecured vendors, who you would expect to have a stake in the company’s eventual successful emergence from bankruptcy, have now traded places with investors seeking a fast financial return.

Saks Global at Risk

If Sak’s Global were operating as a stable platform with a successful sales and margin track record, with capable senior leadership, a reliable operating strategy, and good relationships with its vendors and customers, there would be ample reason for the company to navigate through bankruptcy and emerge with new debt and a newly restructured balance sheet. But none of this appears to be the case. As 2026 unfolds to what will undoubtedly be a challenging year for all retailers, the prospects for Saks Global are truly grim. My sense is that many vendors long ago stopped shipping or have curtailed their support for Saks, Neiman Marcus and maybe even Bergdorf Goodman, and they are unlikely to get back on board after having been egregiously abused these past few years.

Many will find another retailer to serve their customers if they haven’t already done so or continue to build a direct-to-consumer model of their own. Why wouldn’t they? Who needs the sturm und drang of a failing retail partner who doesn’t pay its bills? If that happens, Saks Global is toast.

U.S. logistics, manufacturing and supply-chain firms have started 2026 with a surge of layoffs, facility closures and bankruptcy filings, affecting more than 2,200 workers nationwide.

State notices and court records show job cuts spanning rail support services, parcel networks, food manufacturing, packaging, last-mile delivery and e-commerce, as companies grapple with lost contracts, high costs, excess capacity and tighter credit conditions.

https://www.freightwaves.com/news/layoffs-bankruptcies-batter-u-s-logistics-and-manufacturing-at-start-of-2026