#performance

Pre Dan, VZ was around $39 bucks for a few years. AI Dan promised that with Operational efficiency + layoffs + AI , VZ would be at $70 and be trading at similar multiples to AT&T and T-Mobile. Instead, we seem to meandering along in the mid 40s.

PepsiCo's problem isn't who's running it — it's the math of the industry it sits in. Packaged food and beverage is a mature, low-growth business: organic revenue creeps along at low-single digits while the S&P 500 compounds at roughly 10% a year, which by definition makes the company a laggard inside any portfolio built for growth. And the capital allocation is engineered to protect the dividend, not to reinvest in the business or its people.

PepsiCo is a "Dividend King" that has raised its payout for 50-plus straight years, and that streak is effectively a corporate promise that shareholders get paid first, every year, before anything internal. When the dividend is sacred, the flex line becomes raises, headcount, route investment, and innovation — everything that would actually compound growth. That's a structural choice baked into the company's identity, not a temporary round of belt-tightening.

On top of slow growth, the demand base is eroding from several directions at once. GLP-1 dr-gs are quietly carving a measurable slice of calories out of the market, and appetite suppression is a direct hit to a company whose whole model is selling people more snacks and sweet drinks. Frito-Lay, long the profit engine, is slowing as private-label and generic chips close the quality gap and win the price-sensitive shopper. And carbonated soft drinks — still the richest part of the mix, running roughly double the margin of the "growth" categories like water, sports drinks, and better-for-you snacks — are in a slow secular decline. That combination is the real ki-ler: even when the company grows revenue, it's growing the low-margin stuff while the high-margin stuff shrinks, so profit gets squeezed even in a "good" year. None of that is a management whiff — it's the category mix moving against them.

The squeeze lands hardest at the front line. Merchandising and DSD work keeps getting harder — SKU counts have exploded, mass retailers pile on compliance and service demands, and the physical job is more complex than it's ever been — yet the pay has slipped behind, to where plenty of fast-food jobs now pay better for far less wear on your body. Put it together and the takeaway is simple: because the pressure is industry-structural — slow growth, eroding demand, an adverse margin mix, and a dividend that always eats first — no amount of good leadership can engineer its way out. That's why the layoffs won't stop and why bonuses will always read thin next to higher-growth sectors: leadership isn't underperforming the industry, the industry itself is the ceiling. If you're optimizing a career for growth, you want to be in the sectors pulling that 10%+, not in the one structurally built to fund a dividend

It remains to be seen whether she will be able to address and Drain the Swamp that has accumulated over the past 15–20 years. There is still limited clarity on the actual responsibilities within ISS, beyond attending meetings and adopting titles such as “product manager” without a clearly defined product to manage. Additionally, our current risk‑management structure raises concerns — specifically, why more than 800+ ISS stakeholders are assigned to the exact same risk. Just check boxers. Only a few really understand Computer Science principles - 90% of them just Talk - Presentations - Strategy - with no meat..Of-course there a few gems in ISS but their work will be clouded and the CISO never ever gets to know who are these gems really are..

How is everyone doing?
Another week done and it feels like we are hamsters on wheels. Same s*** different day. We get a message from
Our Chief Revenue Officer about finishing the Q strong - with 2 days to go that’s kinda late. Where he been hanging out the last few months? Maybe if he checked integration that was supposed to help like move to D365 now even more late than the 7th version of timeline we’ll all get to a more stable position?

Why would Oxy pay its Petro Technicals a very generous one time bonus unrelated to yearly goals or performance. Some top onshore and offshore engineers received +$60,000 for their efforts..

Your opinions?
Will COP follow the Oxy extra bonus?

Why would Oxy pay its Petro Technicals a very generous one time bonus unrelated to yearly goals or performance. Some top onshore and offshore engineers received +60,000 for their efforts..

Your opinions?

Why would Oxy pay its Petro Technicals a very generous one time bonus unrelated to yearly goals or performance. Some top onshore and offshore engineers received +60,000 for their efforts..

Your opinions?

Why would Oxy pay its Petro Technicals a very generous one time bonus unrelated to yearly goals or performance. Some top onshore and offshore engineers receives +60,000 for their efforts..

Your opinions?

I am in the higher ed dep, so we usually get "significant impact" merit increase equating to 3.25% of salary regardless of performance. Has this percentage changed for this year? I guess we will find out from our next paycheck.

If we make the product just a little worse, profits will increase by 3.9%.

Rinse and repeat, every time a new exec takes reigns.

With time, all your products are sh-t.

Just finishing meeting with manager and he says I don't have enough computer action. I complete all my assigned tasks on time, never been found wanting. I asked how the data is collected and I'm told it's classified. Why hang me if you can't tell me how to improve. I guess I'll be getting IM rating.

Bungie implemented new layoffs. The studio cited a broader reorganization. Sony's CEO confirmed cuts impact Destiny and Marathon teams. Bungie acknowledged Destiny 2 underperformed. This represents another staff reduction under Sony.

https://www.gameshub.com/news/news/bungie-announce-layoffs-after-destiny-2-enters-maintenance-mode/

Cisco AITECH offers a free, 15-hour crash course and AIBIZ providing only high-level business concepts without a formal exam!

Translation: loss of company $$$ + a way to bypass hiring qualified engineers, allowing non-technical managers to fake technical expertise and undermine the value of a rigorous engineering degree.

ONLY Cisco did this. Top companies knew better.

• 95% of AI pilots fail to deliver measurable profit-and-loss impact is accurate, sourced from the MIT NANDA report.

• Despite $30–40 billion in enterprise investment, only 5% of integrated AI pilots extract measurable value.

• Harvard Business Review says AI is flooding workflows with low-quality output that requires more human intervention to validate, creating a net loss in productivity.

Bottom Line - products, sales fail because they treat AI as a plug-in tool.

I am trying to do my best to finish the month of June strong productivity wise. Will leadership look at our first half of the year performance in determining who they keep in the involuntary layoffs? Any insight would be helpful. Thank you.

One reason I can think of is that FIS has been an undervalued stock, with its share price near a 15-year low. Investors haven’t been happy, and management is under pressure to show improvement. My assumption is that these actions will slow down once the stock starts performing better.
As for why they’re doing gradual cuts instead of one massive reduction, it could be to make the numbers look more like organic improvement rather than a drastic restructuring.
Having spent more than 10 years with the company, I feel that compared to some of our competitors, FIS hasn’t been performing as strongly. The easiest way to quickly improve financial metrics is to reduce operating expenses. However, I don’t fully agree with that approach.

Any other thoughts?

Serious question: what are the repercussions of gutting UM staff if we are expected to meet TAT or face penalties??

Or is it done throughout the year and is person-based? We had a PIP season in my last company, and it was seldom related to performance. I'm just wondering if it's the same here.

Store Managers that are OSA exception stores this is for you:
All eyes are on you right now from RVPs. DMs are at risk of being held accountable for their stores having exceptions.
RVPs don't have eyes on pharmacy ATM as it is June. All eyes are on OSA for the FE.
If your store is an exception store for OSA, your DM must hold SM's accountable to avoid themselves being held accountable by the RVP.
If you are not an OSA exception store, you are in the clear.
Avoiding severance and terminating SM's for "performance" is the cost saving method.
More to come next week.

I assume we can thank the brilliance of the reorg for the absolutely abysmal network performance?

Just a general thread on the stock price performance. Causes and future direction.

But sure, the market l o v e s us...

Is anybody safe when they start giving out PIPs like candy, more than obviously not based on performance?

Markets are down but otex is way up today - we are a strong company with a strong story which the markets love

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ceo-pay-2025-d2885ea3

[Didn't quote entire article text, just extracted AK's info. from the interactive table in the article].

AK ranks 34th out of 392 CEOs on the list:
Total pay: $38M
Pay Change: +51.1%
1-Year Return: 38%
Median Employee Pay: $49,630

Waiting with bated breath for my 51% raise this year!

Centene's single biggest problem is it's leadership...or lack there of. They need to stop worrying about getting the next DEI accolade and do the job. Honestly I don't think they know how and it is time to clean house starting at the very top.
Michael Neidorff is rolling in his grave seeing what his replacement has done to this once thriving company. While he wasn't perfect, this group at the top shouldn't be running a car wash much less a fortune 100 company.
It is time to clean 50% of the directors and above. 100% of the top 10 in charge need to go too. Take 25% of that money saved and use it for the people who actually work. The rest would make up the savings needed to make the company viable again.
The old saying...too many chiefs and not enough Indians is sooooo very true within Centene. Yes, that isn't a politically correct saying. But it fits and Centene needs to STOP worrying about the next DEI trophy and do their damn job being fiscally responsible for the taxpayers money paying for medical benefits!!!

1. She keeps pushing for outside talent that have no idea what we do. Associates and clients just want results not supposed big name! Are we not heavy on top already? You need to keep and bring back former Fiserv talent that know how to keep the lights ON!! That is your path to success. What you are doing shows you do not care and are on your way out!

2. Bank is too big and ineffective, full of non-doers and we are still losing clients. Too many SVPs with no accountability! Sold nothing, keep moving clients from one Core to another and claim victory

3. Credit Union - That leader is a no show. Has a bunch of SVPs that again have no idea what Fiserv does and he is bringing in more to do what??!? He needs to just show up and do the job! He and his band of losers are failing forward over and the circus is not stopping

4. EmFi - does that heavy engine make any money or do anything??

It is going to take Takis too long to figure Dhivya/FIG and these SVPS out. My resume is polished and ready to go. If Fiserv does not care about FIG, why should I any more?!?!?

Been trying to stay optimistic since last week's announcement, but reality has set in.
Here are the facts from my purview: layoffs are inevitable if VSP numbers fall short. Months ago, my PL requested a detailed breakdown of every one of my direct report's duties, along with a performance ranking completely outside our normal review cycle.
There are no coincidences.
Leadership kept this VSP rollout strictly need-to-know at the very top. As a PL, I was left completely in the dark, though looking back, I can admit I ignored the signs.

The OTEX stock has gone down over the past year but it’s now at its lowest it’s been since mid 2013!

Was lowell worth $180M
Was Hans worth $210M
Over a 15 year time frame
Debt $175B
Stock price-$65 to $45.
Headcount reduced -187K to 87.4k
Is the avg employee ar VZ worth what it became -#1 carrier

But you are being pit against your peers in the rankings and the distribution is enforced.

Go team!

Any updates on the technical bonus for Engineers and Geos that was sent out last month? Interested in what percentages people are getting and how its being rolled out. Will there be a match to 401k?

Another beautiful day in the market: software companies are flying, AI names are glowing, cloud stocks are breathing fire and OpenText is politely digging downward like it has a strategic partnership with gravity.

At this point, the stock chart looks less like a technology company and more like a management performance review written by shareholders. Everyone else is selling future growth, AI excitement, and cloud confidence. OpenText is selling adjusted EBITDA, restructuring vocabulary, and the spiritual experience of watching ten years disappear from a portfolio.

But don’t worry. I’m sure another leadership memo will arrive soon explaining how this is all part of a bold transformation journey. Because apparently, when the stock falls while the sector rises, that’s not failure, that’s unlocking long-term value very, very slowly.

When other software companies are being rewarded for cloud, AI, cybersecurity, and recurring revenue, OpenText is somehow managing to look like a company that brought a fax machine to an AI conference. OTEX is around $20.65 USD today, with the stock still weak despite reporting Q3 FY2026 revenue of about $1.28B and cloud revenue growth of 6.6% year over year.

How low will it go? Thinking back to when it was over 4.0

Now that the passions have settled, can we have a normal, objective conversation about what we can expect from Takis? Not oh, he's the worst or he's the best rhetoric of the past week, but let's see what he actually brings to the table and how it'll affect all of us.

I actually think layoffs could be beneficial for this place. We have so many layers of management doing exactly nothing that nobody would miss. Instead of laying off the people who actually get things done, they should for once let go of the right people and everybody would benefit.

As we approach the midway point in 2026, nervousness is starting to set in for several employees in sales.

The narrative across the company is “We are not hitting our numbers.” Remember the numbers we are not hitting are those numbers set by the senior leaders. Senior leaders have far too often set unrealistic goals. The truth is our senior leaders should have seen the trends and adapted to them earlier but here we are sitting on the edge of our seats.

It’s time to rid the company of those individuals in sales that don’t speak with directly with customers. Running a branch of employees that only come on one or two days a week is not needed.

The days of clicking a button and watching the numbers grow are over.

That's pretty pathetic. How can you be an effective leader of a massive corporation like Chevron when half the employees no longer respect you. Even DW at XOM has a higher approval rating.

Nearly every performance metric and benchmark set by the Board has declined during his tenure. It's long past time that MW retires and stop running a once great company into the ground.

Here’s the full picture. The data is sobering.

## DXC Technology: Market Analysis

### Stock Price — 5-Year Collapse

The trajectory is consistent destruction of value: from a 2018 average of ~$80 (peak $93), the stock fell 35% that year, another 28% in 2019, another 30% in 2020. A brief recovery of 25% in 2021 was the last positive year.

From there: -17.7% in 2022, -13.7% in 2023. Into 2024 it was trading around $22–23. The 52-week high was $16.45 in July 2025 — already half of where it was in 2023. The 52-week low hit $7.90 in May 2026. YTD return as of mid-2026: -43.89%.

From $93 peak to ~$8–9 today. That is roughly a 90% destruction of equity value over 8 years.

The consensus from 8 analysts is “Hold.” Average price target: $11.43. BMO Capital lowered its target to $10 from $17, keeping Market Perform. Nobody is bullish. “Hold” at $8–9 is essentially “we don’t know how much further this falls.”

### Revenue — Uninterrupted Decline

Annual revenue of approximately $13.7 billion in FY2024, a decline of over two billion dollars from FY2022.

FY2025 came in at $12.87 billion, down 5.82%. Revenue in the last twelve months (to December 2025) is $12.68 billion, down 3.09% year-over-year.

The most recent quarter: Q4 FY2026 total revenue of $3.13 billion, down 1.2% year-over-year on a reported basis — but down 6.6% on an organic basis. The nominal improvement in reported numbers is forex noise, not operational recovery.

The full organic picture over FY2025: Q1: -4.4%, Q2: -5.6%, Q3: -4.2%, Q4: -4.2%. Full year organic decline: -4.6%. The GIS segment is worse: GIS organic revenue growth across FY2025 was Q1: -9.3%, Q2: -9.6%, Q3: -7.8%, Q4: -6.0% — full year -8.2%.

This is not a one-quarter blip. It is a structural, multi-year revenue haemorrhage.

### “No New Business” — The Book-to-Bill Problem

This is the core issue you’ve identified. In Q1 FY2025, the book-to-bill ratio was 0.77x — compared to 0.89x in Q1 FY2024. A book-to-bill below 1.0 means the company is booking less revenue than it is recognising — i.e., the backlog is shrinking. Consistently below 1.0 is a company consuming itself.

Q2 FY2025 overall book-to-bill: 0.90x. GIS specifically: 0.71x. GIS — their largest segment — was winning less than 71 cents of new work for every dollar of revenue recognised. That is accelerated decline built into future numbers.

The more recent figures look marginally better: Q2 FY2026 trailing twelve-month book-to-bill: 1.15x, with GIS at 1.08x on TTM basis. But context matters — Q4 FY2026 bookings gave a book-to-bill of 1.07x , and organic revenue still fell 6.6% that quarter. Booking more doesn’t reverse the run-off from long-term contracts signed years ago that are now expiring or being reduced.

DXC has made zero acquisitions since November 2019. Over the last five years, the average number of acquisitions per year is zero. There is no inorganic growth play. They are entirely dependent on winning organic new business — which they have been structurally failing to do for years.

### Profitability and Cash — The Complicating Factor

DXC is not going to zero next quarter. Full fiscal year 2026 free cash flow was $713 million, up 3.8% year-over-year. The company repurchased $250 million of shares in FY2026.

Gross margin remained relatively stable at 24.09%, and adjusted EBIT margins are being maintained.

But: GAAP EBIT in Q4 FY2026 was negative — $(39) million, a margin of -1.2%. The gap between non-GAAP “adjusted” figures and GAAP reality has been persistently large due to restructuring charges, amortisation, and pension adjustments. The company has been in near-permanent “restructuring” mode for years.

ROIC is below WACC. The company is destroying economic value — it is worth less each year as an operating entity than the capital tied up in it.

### Can It Survive?

Survival as a listed independent company: questionable beyond 3–5 years without a revenue inflection that has not yet materialised.

The structural problem is this: DXC is a legacy IT outsourcer. Its model — large long-term managed services contracts, rates × hours pricing — is being eroded by cloud migration (clients bring workloads in-house or to hyperscalers), offshore competition (TCS, Infosys, Wipro at lower cost), and now AI automation eating into the billable hour. The CEO acknowledges this directly: “The era of rates times hours is ending.” True. The question is whether DXC can pivot to something else before the existing base runs off.

FY2027 guidance anticipates further revenue decline but margin stability, with AI-driven offerings cited as future support. Every IT services company is saying the same thing about AI. DXC is late to that narrative and has no obvious differentiation.

The most likely exit is acquisition. There have been renewed reports of private equity interest, and in late 2022 a Baring Private Equity Asia takeover was rumoured but fell through. At ~$4.1 billion market cap generating $700M+ of free cash flow annually, the FCF yield is enormous — it is obviously a PE target. The asset would be stripped, carved up, and the cash flow harvested while the workforce is cut.

A shareholder lawsuit investigation was launched in June 2026 , which adds legal distraction at a strategically vulnerable moment.

### Summary Assessment

The cash generation is real and buys time. It also makes the company attractive to a buyer who can cut costs more aggressively than management has been willing to. The narrative around AI and “Xponential AI” and “OASIS” is exactly what a company in distress says. What matters is whether bookings translate into arrested revenue decline — and the gap between book-to-bill improving and organic revenue still falling 6.6% in Q4 FY2026 tells you there is a significant lag at best, a structural impossibility at worst.

The company is not dying this year. It is in managed, prolonged decline, and the probability of meaningful independent recovery is low.

Confidence: High on the factual picture; moderate on the 3–5 year outcome (acquisition vs. slow suffocation are both plausible; a genuine revenue turnaround is the low-probability scenario).

Did you guys see SV’s presentation? He has figured out that physical AI technology of RemainCo is going to change the world and shoot this company to the top. Much as his career has taken off in last 30 years with only PowerPoint slides, without ever getting his hands dirty with any tech project.
Also with UOP taking over HPS management, it’s star is going to shine. Two years ago UOP took over Solstice AM management just for four months before they spun it out and the latter’s stock price has doubled in just 6 months.

After over a decade in corporate banking, I’ve realized that one of the most frustrating things about modern corporate culture is when performance expectations become increasingly subjective.

It’s one thing to be measured on clear outcomes, production, quality, deadlines, or objective standards. It’s another to be told you need more “critical thinking,” more “ownership,” more “judgment,” or more “independence” without clear definitions of what success actually looks like.

What I’ve experienced is a shift away from structured work and toward ambiguity. Employees are expected to make decisions with incomplete information, navigate constantly changing expectations, and somehow know exactly what leaders want even when the target keeps moving.

The irony is that the people doing the work are often asking for clarity because they genuinely want to succeed. Instead, they can be labeled as needing too much guidance or not being independent enough.

At some point, organizations have to ask themselves whether they are creating environments where people can succeed or environments where expectations are so subjective that almost anyone can be told they aren’t meeting them.

I’ve always believed that if someone knows what success looks like, most people will work hard to achieve it. The challenge is when success becomes a moving target.

Maybe it’s not that employees don’t want to perform. Maybe they’re exhausted from trying to hit goals that are difficult to define in the first place.